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Abstract:  
The agreement recently signed between Morocco and the United States foresees several modalities in dismantling 
tariffs. Our simulations show that the various modalities of trade liberalization may have different impacts on the 
welfare, the rate of growth and the sectoral trade balance of these two countries. More precisely, our findings justify 
the interest of a gradual and asymmetrical agreement. In addition, the free trade agreement (FTA) between the US 
and Morocco will have a significant impact not only on trade between the two countries, but also on their trading 
relationships with other countries. The most important trade diversion will affect the EU and particularly France, 
which is Morocco’s largest trading partner. It will also adversely affect the other North African countries. The FTA 
will thus offer the opportunity to Morocco to diversify its markets and its capabilities, which are currently focused on 
the EU, particularly on France and Spain.   
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1. Introduction 
Free trade agreements (FTA) between Morocco and the United States (US) will expose the 
Moroccan economy to increased competition on both price and quality in a range of products. 
This competitive pressure should provoke an increase in productivity on the part of Moroccan 
firms. Under such circumstances, it is quite possible that allowing US exports tariff-free access to 
the Moroccan market could result in substantial trade diversion. Although Moroccan consumers 
could enjoy lower prices, these gains could be more than offset for the economy as a whole 
because of possible producer losses in several activities, of loss in tariff revenue and the purchase 
of goods from the US rather than more efficient sources. In addition, there is the possibility that 
Morocco could experience declines in its terms of trade since its tariff reductions would be much 
larger than those of the US.  
 
The most important contribution related to this FTA has been achieved by Ahmed Galal and 
Robert Z. Lawrence (2003). This interesting study explains clearly why Morocco was at that 
time, a potential partner of the US and a keystone in the project to establish a “US-Middle East 
free trade area within a decade” (as announced by Georges W. Bush on May 2003). Galal and 
Lawrence paper gives some short indication about “substantial trade diversion” (without 
numerical assessment). The authors refer also to some evaluations made by John Gilbert (2003) 
about Moroccan tariff revenues losses, estimated to $ 117 millions currently collected on US 
products (to compare with our result: $ 147.21 millions). Gilbert’s analysis, as ours, is based on 
the GTAP model. However, this research is not focused on the US-Morocco case but covers all 
the US free trade agreements. It provides estimations on imports, exports, Tariff Revenue and an 
assessment of the impact on Moroccan Welfare of all the US Free Trade Agreements considered 
simultaneously. Unfortunately, these simulations do not provide a specific assessment of the 
impact of the US-Morocco free trade agreement considered individually. 
 
The purpose of our paper is precisely to assess the specific impact of the agreement signed by the 
two countries on June 15, 2004 and which came into effect the 1st of January 2006. 
 
The following are the specific questions to be addressed: 
 
First, how does Morocco gain or lose based on the impacts on GDP, trade and other 
macroeconomic aggregates from the bilateral trade liberalization between Morocco 
and the US? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Second, what sectors lose and what sectors gain? 
Third, what are the welfare implications for Morocco from the FTA? 
Fourth, how does the formation of FTA affect trade expansion through the trade 
creation and trade diversion effects? 
Fifth, what are the fiscal implications of the FTA? 
 
Consequently, this study will also try to quantify the impact of the US-Morocco FTA on direct 
revenue. The quantification of the trade expansion will provide a basis for estimating the 
resulting revenue effects due to trade diversion from non-US to US producers and suppliers. 
 
The agreement between Morocco and the US foresees several modalities in dismantling tariffs. 
The problems with dismantling tariffs will be examined in the essential cereals, red meats and 
vegetables sectors where a period of transition is necessary for their survival. Indeed, the 
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American agricultural sector is one of the most efficient in the world, especially for cereals 2. The 
agricultural sector was the main obstacle in the finalization of the FTA. Indeed, the Moroccan 
economy is largely based on the agriculture. Fifty percent of the working population are 
employed in the primary sector, while 70 % of farmers cultivate cereal mostly in small farms 
(73.6% of them are less than 5 hectares with an average equal to 1,64 ha). American products 
would be an extremely serious threat to Moroccan agriculture, as a lot of US products are 
produced at cheaper cost and will presumably be considered rightly or wrongly by Moroccan 
consumers as being of better quality than Moroccan ones, mainly because of a greater level of 
standardization as well as of technological aspects of production, including for GMOs products, 
even though these last one may not correspond to the taste of all Moroccan consumers. 
During the negotiations, the Moroccan party had recommended reserving cereals as a special case 
before total liberalization. However, the position of the US delegation was that an FTA needed to 
include agricultural products. The final agreement stipulated a gradual and further liberalization 
on some very sensitive agricultural product lines (see below).  
 
The benefit of the FTA lies in the structural changes the Moroccan agriculture would undergo to 
make it more competitive and to better exploit the comparative advantages of the country. The 
questions and the answers which are arising from this converge on the same conclusion, as we 
shall demonstrate namely the interest for both partners of an asymmetric agreement and a 
progressive dismantling, especially for Morocco 
 
The article is structured as follows: Following the Introduction, Section 2 highlights Morocco’s 
trade relations with US compared to that with European Union (EU). Section 3 presents the 
methodology used to assess the necessity of an asymmetric FTA, while Section 4 describes the 
models used in the analysis. A description of the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 6 models is made in this section. Section 5 presents 
the main results obtained from the simulations. Lastly, section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Trade performance of Morocco’s economy 
 
Morocco’s major imports and exports are in manufacturing (around 62 % of imports and 65 % of 
exports in value terms in 2001).  Machinery and transport equipment, textiles and chemicals are 
the main imports. Imports of textiles are mainly in connection with sub-contracting, particularly 
with partners in the EU. The rapid increase in their share of total imports of goods was essentially 
due to a change in the way they are entered in the accounts (how they are reflected in trade 
statistics). Agricultural foodstuffs and products from the mining and quarrying industries form 
the primary imported goods. Variations in imports of fuel primarily reflect the fluctuations in 
their global price. 
 
The EU is Morocco’s principal trading partner, both for imports and exports (see figures 1 and 2). 
France alone provides over 20 % (24 % in 2000 and 22.5 % in 2001) of total imports; other major 
importers to Moroccan include Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany. Outside the EU, 
                                                 
2 In 2005, the US was the leading exporter of cereals with a total volume of export equal to 82.2 millions tons (out of 
of world total equal to 279.6 largely ahead of the second exporter the European Union). The US achieved 25.2% of 
the world exports of wheat and 59.3% of world exports of corn. 
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Morocco also imports goods from the US and Saudi Arabia, while the volume of imports from 
other regions is negligible. 
Morocco’s main exports to the EU are textiles and clothing, foods (fishery products, fruit, early 
produce – particularly tomatoes and citrus fruit), flowers and manufactured products. Main 
imports from the EU are fabrics, various types of machinery and equipment, chemicals, plastics, 
and wheat. Industrial products already enter the EU duty-free. The EU-Morocco fisheries 
agreement signed in 1995 expired in 1999. The EU Council of Ministers gave a mandate to the 
Commission to negotiate a Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community 
and the Kingdom of Morocco in early July 2005. Based on this mandate, a new Agreement has 
been agreed and ratified by both sides. It should enter into force in 2007, pending the final 
procedural steps in Morocco. This agreement provides for access of EU vessels in Moroccan 
waters and EU support to the modernization of the fisheries sector. 
 
Table 1. Balance of payments of Morocco, 1995-01 
(US$ millions) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
      
Balance in the current transactions account -1,296 -58 -169 -146 -171 -501 1,606.0
Trade balance -2,482 -2,193 -1,864 -2,319 -2,448 -3,235 -3,022.0
  Exports f.o.b. 6,871 6,886 7,039 7,144 7,509 7,419 7,142.0
  Imports, f.o.b. -9,353 -9,080 -8,903 -9,463 -9,957 -10,654 -10,164.0
Services balance 283 961 747 864 1,112 1,142 1910
  Credit 2,173 2,743 2,471 2,827 3,115 3,034 4,029.0
  Debit -1,890 -1,782 -1,724 -1,963 -2,003 -1,892 -2,119.0
Revenue balance -1,318 -1,309 -1,176 -1,033 -985 -864 -833.0
Current transfers (net) 2,220 2,483 2,123 2,343 2,150 2,456 3,550.0
      
Capital account balance -6 73 -5 -10 -9 -6 -9.0
      
Financial operations account balance -984 -897 -990 -644 -13 -774 -967.0
Direct investment in Morocco 92 76 4 12 3 221 144.0
Direct investment abroad -15 -30 -9 -20 -18 -59 -97.0
Portfolio investment 20 142 38 24 6 17 -8.0
Other investment -1,083 -1,085 -1,022 -660 -4 -954 -1,006.0
      
Errors and omissions 391 209 175 160 123 114 230.0
      
Overall balance -1,895 -673 -988 -640 -69 -1,167 860
      
Financing 1,895 673 988 640 69 1,167 -860
Reserve assets 984 -274 -553 -248 -1,636 416 -3,842.0
Use of IMF resources -101 -47 -3 0 0 0 0.0
Exceptional financing 1,013 995 1,544 887 1,705 751 2,982.0
      
Gross official reserves      
Foreign exchange reserves in terms of months of 
imports 
4.6 5 5.4 5.2 6.7 5.4 9.9
Source: UNCTAD (2005). 
France receives over one quarter of Morocco’s exported goods, followed by Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Germany.  In terms of trade structure, the order of importance of the leading 
partners is the same, both for imports and exports.  The high concentration of exports to the EU is 
mainly due to the change in the method of reflecting sub-contracting operations in the accounts. 
 
Trade between the EU and Morocco has flourished in the last decade. In 2005, 74% of Moroccan 
exports went to the EU, while 65% of Moroccan imports came from the EU. Total trade reached 
21 billion EUR in 2004. The EU is Morocco’s biggest trading partner and the balance of trade is 
still in the EU's favour. (Figure 1) 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Morocco's exports to US compared to EU25
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Figure 2. Evolution of Morocco' imports
 
Source : UNCTAD, 2005 
 
In this paper, we intend to simulate the consequences of the trade liberalization process between 
the two countries with a partial equilibrium analysis that we present first. Then, our results are 
extended and qualified in the light of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis model. 
Indeed, the merit of a partial equilibrium is in providing a first sketch of the expected impacts, by 
revealing at a very disaggregated level the products for which the consequences of the FTA will 
presumably be the most important. Thus, this analysis has the advantage to reveal the products 
and issues which may be considered as the most sensitive in terms of impact on consumer gains, 
on tariffs revenues and evolution of the exports. Logically, we can expect to find among these 
‘sensitive’ products those for which a particular attention has been devoted during the negotiation 
of the agreement due to the high stakes they represent for either one of the two countries. This 
approach can also (eventually) display some products, which may experience important impacts 
in the future, despite that they did not receive a particular attention during the negotiation. 
However, these advantages of a partial equilibrium approach are paid at the costs of being unable 
to address producer impacts and intersectoral and interregional linkage effects. Obviously, these 
two limitations are particularly severe for our subject since it make impossible to have a clear 
appreciation of the welfare impact of the agreement and a precise estimation of its overall 
consequence for each of the two countries, such as the effect of the free trade agreement on the 
economic growth. In order to remedy these limits, we complete this first approach with a CGE 
analysis. For each of these two approaches, we present first the methodology and the main 
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assumptions that we have adopted (section 3 and 4), then our main results and findings (section 
5). 
 
3. The Partial Equilibrium Modelling Framework – the WITS/SMART Model 
This section describes the partial equilibrium modelling methodology that was used in the study, 
based on the WITS/SMART model developed jointly by the World Bank and UNCTAD. In this 
section, we describe first the SMART methodology, and then we present the simulation scenario 
that we have adopted. 
 
3.1. The WITS/SMART Model 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is proposed that the WITS/SMART model will be the applied 
partial equilibrium framework. WITS brings together various databases ranging from bilateral 
trade, commodity trade flows and various levels and types of protection. WITS also integrates 
analytical tools that support simulation analysis. The SMART simulation model is one of the 
analytical tools in WITS used for simulation purposes. SMART contains in-built analytical 
modules that support trade policy analysis, covering the effects of multilateral tariff cuts, 
preferential trade liberalization and ad hoc tariff changes. The underlying theory behind this 
analytical tool is the standard partial equilibrium framework that considers dynamic effects to be 
constant. Like any partial equilibrium model, these strong assumptions only allow trade policy 
analysis to be undertaken one country at a time. In spite of this weakness, WITS/SMART can 
help estimate trade creation, diversion, welfare and revenue effects. 
 
3.1.1. Trade creation 
 
The underlying theory is summarized below for the estimation of the trade flows and revenue 
effects. The exposition of the WITS/SMART theory is summarized from Laird and Yeats (1986). 
Trade creation captures the trade expanding aspects of liberalisation that leads to the 
displacement of inefficient producers in a given preferential trading area (a free trade area for 
instance). It is assumed that there is full transmission of price changes when tariff or non-tariff 
distortions (ad valorem equivalents) are reduced or eliminated. Laird and Yeats (1986) derive 
clearly the equation that can be used to estimate the trade creation effects. The derivation begins 
with the following basic trade model composed of simplified import demand and export supply 
functions and an equilibrating identity: 
 
A simplified import demand function for country j from country k of commodity i: 
),,( ikijjijk PPYfM =        (1) 
 
The export supply function of commodity i of country k can be simplified as: 
)( ikjijk PfX =         (2) 
 
The equilibrium in the trade between the two countries is the standard partial equilibrium 
equation: 
ikjijk XM =         (3) 
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In a free trade environment, the domestic price3 of commodity i in country j from country k 
would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff as follows: 
)1( ijkikjijk tPP +=        (4) 
 
To derive the trade creation formula, following Laird and Yeats (1986), the price equation (4) is 
totally differentiated to get: 
ikjijkijkikjijk dPtdtPdP )1( ++=       (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) are then substituted into the elasticity of import demand equation4 to get: 



 ++= ikj
ijk
ijk
ijkm
i
ijk
ijk
P
dP
t
dt
M
dM
)1(
η      (6) 
 
From the identity in equation (3), 
ikj
ikj
ijk
ijk
X
dX
M
dM =  can be used to derive the following expression 
for elasticity of export supply: 
ijk
ijk
e
iikj
ikj
M
dM
P
dP
γ
1=  
which when used in equation 6, allows the computation of the trade creation effect. From 
equation (3) the trade creation effect is equivalent to exporting country k’s growth of exports of 
commodity i to country j: 
))/1)(1(( ei
m
iijk
ijkm
iijkijk t
dt
MTC γηη −+=     (7) 
 
If , then equation (7) can be simplified as follows: ∞→eiγ
)1(
)1()1(
0
01
ijk
ijkijk
ijk
m
iijk t
tt
MTC +
+−+= η      (8) 
 
where TCijk is the sum of trade created in millions of dollars over i commodities affected by tariff 
change and is the elasticity of import demand for commodity i in the importing country from 
the relevant trading partner. M
m
iη
ijk is the current level of import demand of the given commodity i. 
and represent tariff rates for commodity i at the initial and end periods respectively. Trade 
creation then depends on the current level of imports, the import demand elasticity and the 
relative tariff change. 
0
ijkt
1
ijkt
 
3.1.2. Trade diversion 
 
                                                 
3 The transport and insurance costs are not reflected in the equation explicitly.  
4 The elasticity of import demand is 
ijk
ijkm
i
ijk
ijk
P
P
M
M ∆=∆ η  
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Trade diversion as opposed to trade creation can expand or contract trade globally. Trade 
diversion is the phenomenon that occurs in a free trade area for example whereby efficient 
producers from outside the free trade area are displaced by less efficient producers in the 
preferential area. In the particular case of the US-Morocco FTA, trade diversion would take 
place, if as a result of this agreement, more efficient suppliers of the rest of the world into the US 
are replaced by less efficient Moroccan ones or conversely. Trade diversion can affect both 
suppliers of the US (for example in South America) or suppliers of Morocco (namely in Europe).     
The theory underlying the measurement of trade diversion in SMART is also explained in Laird 
and Yeats (1986). To see the derivation clearly, first the expression for elasticity of substitution is 
given. The elasticity of substitution can be expressed as the percentage change in relative shares 
of imports from two different sources due to a one per cent change in the relative prices of the 
same product from these two sources: 
 
( ) ( )ijKijkijKijk k K
ijKijk
K
ijK
k
ijk
M PPPP
MMMM
///
///
∆




∆
=
∑ ∑∑∑
σ    (9) 
 
where k denotes imports from US and K denotes imports from the rest of the World (ROW). 
Equation (9) can be expanded, and through substitutions and rearrangements be used to obtain 
the expression for trade diversion, which is expressed as: 
 
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∆++
∆
=
K
M
k ijKijk
ijKijk
ijkijK
k
ijk
M
k K ijKijk
ijKijk
ijKijk
k
ijk
ijk
ijk
PP
PP
MMM
PP
PP
MM
M
M
TD
σ
σ
/
)/(
/
)/(
 (10) 
 
Equation (10) can be simplified to the case of a FTA. The relative price movement terms in the 
equation as noted in Laird and Yeats (1986) capture the movement due to changes in tariffs or the 
ad valorem incidence of non-tariff distortions for the US and the ROW. Therefore, the trade 
diverted to the US in the FTA, TD  can be captured by reducing equation (10) above as 
follows:  
FTA
 
M
US
USUSROWUS
M
US
USROWUS
FTA
t
tMMM
t
tMM
TD
σ
σ



 −+
+++



 −+
+
=
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
   (11) 
 
Equation (11) shows the additional US imports. USM  and ROWM  are the current imports into 
Morocco from the US and ROW respectively.  and are respectively the end and initial 
periods import tariffs imposed on US imports in the destination to Morocco with t . 
1
USt
0
USt
01
USUS t< Mσ  is 
the elasticity of substitution between US and ROW imports into Morocco. Trade diversion then 
depends on the current level of imports from the US and ROW, the percentage change (reduction 
in this case) of tariffs facing US imports with those for ROW remaining unchanged and the 
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elasticity of substitution of the imports from the two sources. The higher the value of the 
elasticity of substitution, the greater will be the trade diversion effects. 
 
3.1.3. Trade expansion 
 
Adding the trade creation and diversion derives the total effect on trade. As indicated in Laird and 
Yeats (1986), the summation in equations (8) and (10) for an importing country can be done 
across products and/or across sources. It is also possible to sum the results across a group of 
importers for single or groups of products as well as for single sources of supply or groups of 
suppliers. 
 
3.1.4. The revenue effect 
 
The quantification of the revenue effect using WITS/SMART model is simple. In theory, the 
tariff revenue is given as the product of the tax rate (tariff rate in this case) and the tax base (the 
value of imports). Thus, before the change in the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers, the 
revenue is given as: 
 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR
0
0  
 
After the change in the tariff rate, the new revenue collection will be given by: 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR
1
1  
 
The revenue loss as a result of the implementation of a FTA would then be the net effect between 
R1 and R0  which is the same as: 
 
∑∑∆=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtRL       (12) 
 
3.1.5. Consumer’s gains 
 
The WITS/SMART model estimation of consumer’s gain is quite simple. This is unlike the 
equivalent variations measurement in general equilibrium models. The benefit for consumers in 
the importing country is the result of lower import prices5. This allows them to substitute more 
expensive domestic or imported products with the cheaper imports that are affected by the 
relevant tariff reduction. Increased imports leads to a gain that can be thought as the increase in 
consumer welfare and is measured as follows: 
 
)(5.0 ijkijkijk Mtw ∆∆=        (13) 
 
                                                 
5 As emphasized in Laird and Yeats (1986), in the case of pre-existing level of imports, there is no net welfare gain 
in the country as the tariff reduction simply means a reallocation/transfer of revenue from the government to the 
consumers. 
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The coefficient of 0.5 captures the average between the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers 
before and after their elimination/reduction. Equation (13) assumes that the elasticity of export 
supply is infinite. If this is not the case, the import prices in the importing countries fall by less 
than the full reduction in trade barriers. Therefore, while the equation can be used to measure 
welfare effect, it is no longer a representation of consumer surplus alone but has some element of 
producer surplus (see Laird and Yeats, 1986). 
 
3.1.6. The database 
 
WITS database comes from various sources. The external trade statistics comprise of UN 
COMTRADE, UNCTAD TRAINS and the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB). The tariffs data is 
derived from UNCTAD TRAINS, WTO IDB and WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedule Data Base 
(CTS). The non-tariff measures are compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS database. 
 
3.2. Simulation scenario 
 
In the partial equilibrium approach, we consider only one scenario. This scenario looks only at 
the reciprocity principal. Due to the weaknesses already pointed out, especially the ceteris paribus 
assumption upon which this model operates, only one-way liberalization is possible. The results 
discussed here are the possible outcomes of reducing to zero the import duties that Morocco 
imposes on US goods. One special advantage of the WITS/SMART model is that it allowed the 
analysis to be undertaken at the 6-digit level. Trade created from the full reciprocity scenario 
depends on the following three key elements as discussed in the analytical methodology: the 
initial level of trade (imports from the US); the initial level of protection; and the price elasticity 
of import demand. The higher the initial level of protection, the greater the change expected from 
the reciprocation policy will be. The transmission mechanism for the trade effects is simple: the 
elimination of existing tariffs on US imports reduces the prices that consumers in Morocco face 
compared to domestic substitutes, while the responsiveness of demand to the price change 
influences the amount of trade created or diverted. The substitutability of US goods for domestic 
goods is implicitly assumed. The Armington assumption at HS 6-digit level is that goods 
imported from different countries are imperfect substitutes. It is also assumed that the supply 
response to the price reduction will allow US producers and exporters to meet any demand 
arising in the importing countries as a result of price reduction. That is, export supplies are 
perfectly elastic, meaning that world supplies of each variety of the goods by origin are given. 
 
4. General Equilibrium Analytical Methodology  
By definition, in a partial equilibrium model, the inter-sectoral implications of trade policy 
change are not taken into account. Similarly, the inter-regional implications are also ignored in a 
partial equilibrium framework. For this reason, trade policy analysis is more robust when 
undertaken within a general equilibrium-modelling framework. This can be seen as the best 
option as general equilibrium models not only measure the first-round effects of simulated 
change (as is the case in the partial equilibrium approach), but also the second-round effects 
which include inter-industry effects and macroeconomic adjustments.  
 
This section discusses in detail the methodology applied for the empirical analysis. The 
discussion starts by outlining the GTAP modelling and data framework. 
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4.1. Rationale for a General Equilibrium Methodology 
Trade policy analysis involves examining implications of trade policy instruments on the 
production structure in economies at the national and global level. Trade policy instruments, such 
as tariffs and quotas, have direct and indirect effects on the relative prices of commodities 
produced in a given country. As the mix of goods and services produced changes, the demand for 
factors of production also changes. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive a situation in any 
economy where the change in trade policy affects only one sector. Due to the forward and 
backward linkages and their related strengths existing in a particular economy, the result is 
always one in which the relative mix of sectoral outputs change. This, by extension, affects the 
relative mix of the different factors of production in the different sectors.  
 
The country-level effects on output mix and demands for factors of production can in the context 
of international trade be extended to the global economy. Changes in relative prices of outputs 
and inputs resulting in a given country’s change in trade policy are transmitted to the industries 
and input markets of other economies that the country trades with. Therefore, for trade policy 
analysis to be meaningful and for robust results to be produced, the interactions that prevail 
among different sectors as a result of a change in a given group of countries trade policy 
instruments must be taken into account. The general equilibrium methodology provides an 
analytical framework that allows for inter- and intra-sectoral changes in output mix, and by 
extension the demand for different factors of production to be captured.  
 
Kehoe T. and Kehoe P. (1994) succinctly captured the essence of general equilibrium models. 
General equilibrium models are an abstraction that is complex enough to capture the essential 
features of the economy, yet simple enough to be tractable. These models are popular over their 
partial equilibrium counterparts because they stress the interactions among different sectors. 
However, they are not perfect, especially the static ones, since they fail to take into account the 
dynamic effects that accompany changes taking place in a given economy as a result of policy 
change. The GTAP model falls in this class of general equilibrium models. GTAP is a multi-
region CGE model designed for comparative-static analysis of trade policy issues (Adams et al. 
1997) 6.  
 
There are four types of behavioral parameters in GTAP: elasticities of substitution (in both 
consumption and production), transformation elasticities that determine the degree of mobility of 
primary factors across sectors, the flexibilities of regional investment allocation, and consumer 
demand elasticities. The parameters that describe demand behavior in initial equilibrium for the 
representative private household are region-specific. Consumer behavior in GTAP is based on the 
constant differences of elasticities (CDE) expenditure function, which is most naturally calibrated 
to income and own-price elasticities of demand (Hertel et al., 1991). The CDE specification 
allows for more flexibility in specifying varying degrees of substitution between consumer goods 
purchases. This specification is also less restrictive in how one specifies correlations between 
household wealth and private goods consumption patterns. 
 
For agricultural and food commodities, we draw upon the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) model (FAO, 1993), which has proved to be a good source for recent estimates of income 
                                                 
6 The interested reader can find all the relevant information about this model, both its structure and possible 
applications in the remarkable book published by Thomas W. HERTEL (1997), Global Trade Analysis. Modelling 
and Applications. Cambridge University Press. 
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elasticities. For non-agricultural and nonfood commodities, we used income elasticities from the 
SALTER model and Theil, Chung and Seale (1989). A full description of the elasticities used in 
this exercise is detailed in Zeitsch et al (1991).   
 
Demand: The demand side is modeled in each region through a representative agent, whose 
utility function is intra-temporal, with a fixed share of regional income allocated to savings and 
the rest being used to purchase final consumption. Consumption trade-off across sectors is 
represented through a Cobb Douglas utility function.  
  
Supply: Production makes use of five factors: capital; skilled labour; unskilled labour; land; and 
natural resources. The first three are generic factors; the last two are specific factors. The 
production function assumes perfect complementarity between value added and intermediate 
consumption. The structure of value-added is intended to take into account the well-documented 
skill-capital relative complementarity. Constant returns to scale and perfect competition are 
assumed to hold in agricultural sectors.  
 
Capital, markets clearing and macroeconomic closure: The capital good is the same whatever the 
use sector, and capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors within each region. At the 
regional-wide level, capital stock is assumed to be constant in the core simulations of this paper. 
Natural resources are also perfectly immobile and may not be accumulated. Both types of labour 
(skilled and unskilled), as well as land, are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, while 
production factors are assumed to be fully employed. As for macroeconomic closure, the current 
balance is assumed to be exogenous (and equal to its initial value in real terms), while real 
exchange rates are endogenous. 
 
This model can be used to capture effects on output mix, factor usage, trade effects and resultant 
welfare distribution between countries as a result of changing trade policies at the country, 
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Since the GTAP model puts emphasis on resource 
reallocation across economic sectors, it is a good instrument for identifying the winning and 
losing countries and sectors under policy changes involving the trade aspects of FTAs. 
 
 
4.2. The GTAP Database and the Study Aggregation 
4.2.1. Data description 
The GTAP model is used together with the GTAP database which, like the model, captures 
individual and composites of countries. In this exposition, Version 6 of the database is used. The 
base year for this version is 2001 and recognizes 87 regions as well as 57 sectors and 5 factors of 
production. Thus, for each individual or composite region, there are 57 sectors whose data is 
captured in the overall GTAP database. As previously indicated, not all countries are individually 
captured in GTAP. However, each economy is indirectly included in the database as part of a 
given composite region or as part of the rest of the world. Thus, global macroeconomic 
consistency holds. For the purpose of our study, Morocco and the US are presented separately.  
 
Bilateral trade data is a critical component of the GTAP database. It is these bilateral trade flows 
that transmit policy and growth shocks between countries. Indeed, trade shares are important in 
explaining the simulation results. Bilateral trade is also important when looking at the terms of 
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trade implications. The global bilateral data is sourced from the United Nations COMTRADE 
data. This is supplemented with individual countries global trade information and trade totals or 
aggregate bilateral trade statistics such as those available from the IMF, FAO and World Bank. 
 
Another important sub-component of the GTAP database is data protection. Data is both explicit 
and implicit. It is explicit in the sense that tariff or export revenue and anti-dumping data by 
commodity and region are available. It is implicit in the sense that bilateral trade data is available 
both in market and world prices. The key sources of the protection data vary. Agricultural tariffs 
are obtained from the Economic Research Service, the EU and the applied or Most-Favoured 
Nation (MFN) rates. Merchandise tariffs, on the other hand, are available from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution project of the World Bank and UNCTAD (details of WITS are 
presented in the section discussing the SMART methodology). Domestic support protection data 
is obtained from the OECD’s producer subsidy equivalent tables and can be divided into output 
subsidies, input subsidies, land-based and capital-based payments. 
 
4.2.2. Sectoral and geographical aggregations 
 
For the present study, 87 regions have been aggregated into 5 subregions, and 57 sectors have 
been identified. A complete description of the sectoral and geographical aggregation is posted in 
Annex 1. 
 
4.2.3. Scenarios tested in the CGE modelling 
 
In order to assess the overall effect of the FTA on the Moroccan economy, we test three 
scenarios: 
• Scenario 1: Strongly asymmetrical liberalization. All tariffs and quotas are removed by 
the US on imports from Morocco (duty free, quota free entrance for Moroccan exports), 
while Morocco reduces its tariffs on imports from the US by 10% (which roughly 
corresponds to a one-year liberalization impact for Morocco in the actual agreement);  
 
• Scenario 2: Intermediate asymmetrical liberalization. All tariffs are removed by the US 
on imports from Morocco, while Morocco reduces tariffs on imports from the US by 
50%; and 
 
• Scenario 3: Full reciprocity, full liberalization. All bilateral tariffs are removed between 
Morocco and the US. All ad valorem tariffs, which appear in Figure 1, are reduced to 
zero.  
 
All of the macroeconomic, trade and protection data refer to the common reference year 2001.   
 
Various international agreements have been implemented with important implications on the 
global economic landscape. It is therefore important that these changes be captured in our 
simulations. The main events to include are: the enlargement of the European Union; the 
implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as part of the multifiber agreement 
(MFA) phase out; the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on domestic support and 
export subsidies; the full accession of China into the WTO; and the conclusion of the Doha 
Development Round. The Doha Round outcome is currently not clear how it will likely impact 
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both economies. Therefore, it has not been built into our scenarios. As for the other four main 
issues, the following discussions explains how they were incorporated into the scenarios tested: 
 
Enlargement of the EU: An enlarged EU will ultimately be the trading bloc that Morocco will 
have to face by the time the FTA come into effect. First, all tariffs and export subsidies as well as 
non-tariff barriers between the EU-15 and the new ten members are abolished. Second, trade 
barriers among the 10 new EU members have also been eliminated. Finally, all sectors in the EU-
10 are given the same level of protection against the rest of the world as found in the EU-15 at 
the time of the accession. This means that some of the tariff rates that the new EU members 
charge third countries have been increased or reduced to the existing levels of the old EU 
members.  
 
Elimination of MFA quotas (implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing): It is 
expected that the phasing out of the multifibre agreement on textiles and clothing will have 
significant implications for developing countries and Morocco more particularly. It was therefore 
important to capture the likely effects of the removal of the MFA into our reference scenario. The 
elimination of the MFA was captured through elimination of the export tax equivalents of the 
textile and clothing quotas in the developed countries markets in particular. 
 
Uruguay Round Agreement implementation: The US has traditionally used domestic support and 
export subsidies especially in agriculture. While the Doha Round negotiations are expected to 
have an agreement that will have dramatic impacts on how these two instruments are applied, 
there are still outstanding issues from the Uruguay Round. Our simulations capture the 20 percent 
reductions for developed countries domestic support. A rate of 13 percent was applied for the 
developing countries. In the case of the agricultural export subsidies, the scenarios implement the 
36 percent and 24 percent reductions agreed at the Uruguay Round for developed and developing 
countries respectively. 
 
China accession to the WTO: The full accession of China to the WTO is expected to have 
important implications for Morocco and US. At full accession, all WTO members will be 
expected to impose import tariffs on Chinese goods on an MFN basis. This was captured in our 
simulations by reducing tariffs on Chinese imports above the highest rate currently charged by 
importing country on each commodity. 
 
These 3 scenarios are compatible with the main objectives of the Doha agenda related to market 
access and the reductions of all forms of export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support. 
 
Actually, none of the three scenarios correspond to the actual agreement, although they give 
some indication of the relative importance of having an asymmetric agreement. Indeed, the U.S.-
Morocco FTA eliminates tariffs on 95% of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products 
(including textiles) with all remaining tariffs to be eliminated within 9 years. Particular treatment 
is reserved for agricultural products. Some important Moroccan exports, such as clementines, 
tomatoes and olives, will be allowed to enter the US duty-free market on the first day of 
implementation. Morocco will in turn provide immediate duty-free access to American products 
such as pistachios, pecans, nuts, almonds, processed poultry product (with some restriction), 
pizza cheese and other foodstuff. For all other agricultural products, tariffs will be phased out in 5 
to 15 years. The agreement includes broad commitments in some key services, namely banking 
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and insurance (with a 4-year protection period), distribution, express delivery, engineering, 
audiovisual and telecommunications.  
 
An important characteristic of the agreement is that it includes asymmetrical commitments to 
Morocco’s advantage, as suggested by Scenarios 1 and 2. This asymmetry is justified by the 
difference in the level of development of the trading partners and by the difference in the average 
level of the tariff schedules of the 2 countries, which amounts to more than 20% for Morocco 
against 4% for the US (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Ad valorem tariffs on different commodities (bilateral trade) 
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5.1. Identifying specific products: Partial Equilibrium Results 
 
In this section, the results using the WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model showing the 
possible impact of the FTA on Morocco are discussed, under the assumption of a full reciprocity, 
full liberalization scenario. Essentially, we want to analyze the possible consequences of a 
complete elimination of tariff barriers on the Moroccan economy and first of all the impacts on 
consumer’s surplus. One of the main justifications of liberalization is to reduce the price paid by 
consumers, increasing thus their purchasing power. So, our main objective in this fifth section is 
to analyze as accurately as possible consumers’ potential gain for the products that we can 
identify as the most sensitive. In this section, we analyze also the consequence of this scenario on 
product-specific tariff revenues and exports. We choose to simulate the impact of a complete 
dismantlement of tariffs in order to clearly expose the effects of trade liberalization on all 
Moroccan products. This is therefore an “extreme scenario” which aims at delineating the general 
trends of the impact of liberalization of the Maroccan economy under the FTA. The results on 
trade creation and diversion are also reported. 
 
5.1.1. Impact on consumer’s surplus 
 
It is important to underline that the WITS SMART model does not allow us to evaluate the total 
impact of the FTA on welfare, because it captures only consumer’s surplus. In order to obtain a 
complete view of this impact, it is necessary to address also the effects for producers. In addition, 
these impacts must not be evaluated product by product, but as a whole, taking into account 
general equilibrium linkages. This is what we intend to do in the next section. As underlined 
above, the partial equilibrium approach is just aimed at identifying sensitive products.  
 
Table 2 displays the Harmonized system chapters (HS02) yielding the highest welfare gains for 
Morocco. Together, these 6 product groups account for more than 65% of total consumers’ gains 
in the country in the case of liberalization of trade with the US.  By far, the group of products 
yielding the highest gains for consumers are cereals (32.4%), followed by electrical equipment 
and plastic industries (20%). Not surprisingly, our simulations show that taking into 
consideration only the effect on consumer welfare, Moroccan consumers should benefit greatly of 
trade liberalization. They will be able to purchase US consumer goods (part of the immediate 
liberalization) at cheaper prices, obtaining thus an immediate – but limited - improvement in their 
standard of living. Indeed, in a full liberalization scenario, the total improvement in Moroccan 
consumer welfare would equal US$24.9 million per year (Table 2). 
 
Moroccan consumers will derive gains from the FTA since they will have access to goods at 
lower prices. To this point, it is assumed that US producers and exporters will not be pricing to 
market. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that US exporters and Moroccan 
importers will pass the benefits of tariff reductions on to Moroccan consumers. If the benefits of 
tariff dismantlement are not passed on to Moroccan consumers but are captured by the exporter 
or the importer, it is possible that there will be no increase in consumer welfare.  
 
It is therefore crucial to ensure that welfare is transmitted to consumers. To this end, it is 
necessary that the competition policy shield consumers against possible abuse of potential 
dominant positions or against collusion from large importers. Competition policy capacities and 
the judicial system supporting it should therefore be strengthened to ensure that the FTA delivers 
its potential benefits. 
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Let us note that increased imports through trade creation do not necessarly benefit only to 
consumers. Potential gains are also likely to emanate from embodied technologies in some 
imports that may eventually be welfare enhancing. This will however depend on capital 
equipment and machinery and such imports that tend to have embodied technologies  
 
Table 2. Impact of full liberalization on consumer welfare in Morocco by commodity  
(in millions of US dollars) 
Sectors Welfare Changes % Cumulative 
Cereals 8.07 32.4% 32.0% 
Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  sound recorder etc 3.20 12.8% 44.8% 
Plastics and articles thereof 1.79 7.2% 52.0% 
Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp,  paper/paperboard 1.61 6.5% 58.5% 
Rubber and articles thereof 1.16 4.6% 63.1% 
Mineral fuels, oils & product of their  distillation; etc 1.13 4.5% 67.6% 
Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, pts  & accessories 0.85 3.4% 71.0% 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 0.79 3.2% 74.2% 
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 0.75 3.0% 77.2% 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech  appliance; parts 0.66 2.7% 79.9% 
Iron and steel 0.46 1.8% 81.7% 
Cotton 0.40 1.6% 83.3% 
Man-made staple fibres 0.36 1.4% 84.8% 
Miscellaneous chemical products 0.33 1.3% 86.1% 
Articles of iron or steel 0.32 1.3% 87.4% 
Pharmaceutical products 0.24 1.0% 88.3% 
Others 2.8  11.7% 100.00% 
Total 24.9 100.0%   
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation  
 
5.1.2. Impact on Moroccan tariffs revenues 
 
As would be expected, the elimination of import tariffs from the US is shown to harm 
government revenues in Morocco. In a full liberalization scenario, the FTA would significantly 
reduce Moroccan tariff revenues by more than US$147 million. Almost 60% of these losses 
would result from the elimination of duties on the import of US cereals (Table 3). This represents 
0.5% of GDP and 4.5% of the balance of payments. Once again, one may mention that cereals 
account for almost 60% of the revenue shortfall. We can therefore understand why this product 
was treated separately during the negotiations. 
 
In some cases, the bulk of the loss of revenues comes from the elimination of tariffs on goods 
that could otherwise be easily taxed. Nevertheless, in terms of evaluating the FTA for Morocco, it 
can be noted that the foregone revenue is likely to have negative impacts on other government 
programmes. When this is combined with undermining regional integration, one is left with a 
picture that goes beyond normal international trade theory arguments. The question about the 
significance of non-economic reasons for integration comes into play. It is therefore necessary to 
look closer at the real weight of such a revenue loss on government finance. If the FTA entails 
full liberalization of US imports, Morocco would have to forgoe tariff revenues amounting to 
almost 2.5% of their public revenue. 
 
It is important to note however that the revenue loss indicated by our simulations relates to 
imports tariff revenues. In reality, the increased imports presented earlier resulting from trade 
creation are in most countries subject to indirect taxes such as the VAT. As such, as long as there 
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is rapid increase in the volume and value of imports into Morocco, and this country has indirect 
taxes such as VAT, then the revenue shortfall described will be minimized. However, unless the 
elasticity of the VAT and indirect taxes is significantly higher than that for import duties, it is 
unlikely that addition indirect tax revenues will outweigh the foregone revenue from the import 
tariffs.  
 
Table 3. Impact of full liberalization on tariff revenue losses in Morocco 
 (Millions of US dollars) 
 
Description Variation of tariff revenues % 
Cereals -85.93 58.4%
Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  sound recorder etc -9.90 6.7%
Mineral fuels, oils & product of their distillation; etc -7.19 4.9%
Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp,  paper/paperboard -6.27 4.3%
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes -5.54 3.8%
Oil seed, oleagi fruits; miscell grain,  seed, fruit etc -5.147 3.5%
Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech appliance; parts -3.43 2.3%
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof -2.45 1.7%
Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, pts  & accessories -2.17 1.5%
Iron and steel -2.09 1.4%
Cotton -1.57 1.1%
Articles of iron or steel -1.54 1.0%
Man-made staple fibres -1.43 1.0%
Rubber and articles thereof -1.06 0.7%
Pharmaceutical products -0.97 0.7%
Others -10.50 7.0%
Total  -147.21 100%
Source: Authors’ WITS simulation 
 
5.1.3. Impact on exports 
 
By providing duty free access to an American consumer market with 300 million individuals, the 
FTA will strongly stimulate Moroccan exports. Not surprisingly, this expansion would primarily 
concern the textile and clothing industry, which is the most important industrial activity in 
Morocco (43% of the country’s industrial exports, providing 39.5% of total industrial 
employment). Table 4 shows that the agreement will likely have strong effects concentrated only 
on a limited number of sectors. Simultaneously, US exports to Morocco would increase at a still 
higher percentage: 36,28% against 22,58% (Table 5). 
 
Table 4. Total impact of full liberalization on Morocco’s exports to the US in selected products  
(in thousands of US dollars and as a % of the sectoral Moroccan exports to the US) 
 
Products Before After Change In Revenue % of increase 
Art of apparel & clothing access, not knitted/crocheted 48.83 71.48 22649.412 4 .4% 6 
Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or crocheted 28.27 45.87 17603.708 62.3% 
Mineral fuels, oils & product of their distillation; etc 131.15 139.65 8497.814 6.5% 
Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 4.54 6.47 1934.601 42.6% 
Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs etc 10.48 12.08 1608.979 15.4% 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 6.00 6.57 566.686 9.4% 
 Total  237.77 291.45 53.68 22.58% 
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
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Table 5. Total impact of full liberalization on US exports to Morocco 
(Millions of US dollars) 
 
Before After Change In Revenue % of increase 
567.57 773.51 205.936 36.28% 
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
 
5.1.4. Impact on third countries 
 
This section looks at possible impact of trade diversions on Morocco resulting from the FTA. It 
starts with a presentation of the losses in intra-regional trade, due to the substitution of intra-
regional exports by US products. Then, it will attempt to identify which products could be most 
affected by losses of intra-regional trade and would suffer the most from US competition.  
 
Trade diversion is the quantity of exports (of third countries) that is being replaced by US 
products after liberalization. We assume here that the effect of the elimination of the tariff is fully 
transmited to consumer prices. Indeed, the FTA between the US and Morocco will have 
significant impact not only on trade between these two countries, but also on the trading 
relationship with other countries. The most important trade diversion will affect the EU and 
particularly France, which is Morocco’s largest trading partner. It will also have adverse effects 
on the other North African countries (Table 6). The FTA will thus offer the opportunity to 
Morocco to diversify its markets and its capabilities which are currently strongly focused on the 
EU, particularly France and Spain.  
 
The risk that countries affected by trade diversion, namely the EU, retaliate (“negative response) 
is likely insignificant. Actually, for France which is the most concerned country, the loss of 
export represent only 0.5% of the total French to Morocco exports. For Spain, the corresponding 
percentage is 0.6 and for the EU, it is 0.3 However, this does not mean that France and more 
generally the EU will accept in the future negotiations with Morocco trading conditions which 
would be less favourable than those granted to the US. Nowadays, as a result of the US-Morocco 
FTA, the US receive a better treatment than the EU for several products namely durum wheat. 
Consequently, everything leads one to believe that all the trading advantages which have been 
granted to the US will probably represent not the final objective but rather the starting point in 
the future agricultural negotiations between the EU and Morocco.  
 
On another side, it is perfectly possible that the UE might respond “positively” to the US 
Morocco FTA by negotiating an extensive euromed partnership agreement. This might have 
significant consequences both for Morocco and the rest of North African countries (See below 
5.2.4) 
 
19 
Table 6. Impact of full liberalization on Moroccan trade with third countries 
(in millions of US dollars) 
 
Partner Total Trade Diversion 
USA + 92.60 
UMA -0.24 
Tunisia -0.20 
Algeria -0.03 
Libya -0.16 
Rest of Africa -3.63 
European Union -36.43 
France -17.23 
Spain -4.77 
Rest of the World -51.28 
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
 
Our partial equilibrium simulations show that imports from the US to Morocco would increase by 
approximately US$53.68 million. Finally, our model shows results, albeit incomplete, concerning 
welfare gains. It seems that consumer surplus would mainly be improved through lowering the 
price of industrial goods such as cars, machinery and equipment. Furthermore, the FTA would 
significantly reduce Moroccan tariff revenues by more than US$147 million. However, the partial 
equilibrium results tell only one part of the story. In particular, it should be noted that the overall 
economic welfare effects are not clear within a partial equilibrium modelling framework since 
producer surplus changes, especially since the supplanting of domestic producers by EU 
producers has not been captured in this analysis. A CGE analysis can adress such producer 
impacts as well as linkage effects, thus qualifying some of our previous results. 
 
5.2. Assessing welfare and linkage effects: General Equilibrium Results  
Using the GTAP simulation model, we propose a quantitative assessment of the potential impacts 
of the three possible implementations of free trade described above on the economic growth of 
the two countries, on welfare, on sectoral value added, on exports, imports, trade balance and 
terms of trade.  
 
5.2.1. Impacts on growth and welfare 
 
As shown in Table 7 and Figures 4 and 5, the additional growth provided by trade liberalization 
is modest in the two countries, but not inconsiderable in Morocco (the rate of growth of 
Moroccan GDP would be increased by an additional 0.37% and a net welfare gain equal to 
US$37 million in the first scenario (strongly asymmetrical liberalization). The difference in the 
impact on the US and Moroccan GDP and welfare are clearly related to the difference in the size 
of the two countries and in the importance of their bilateral trade relations.  
 
In any scenario, the impact of trade liberalization on the rate of growth would be much more 
important for Morocco than for the US, taking into account the difference in the bilateral trade 
flows sizes: US imports from Morocco represent 0.03% of total US imports, while Moroccan 
imports from the US correspond to 3.4% of total Moroccan imports.  Welfare effects, on the other 
hand, are much greater in the US, when reported in millions of USD. Clearly, the impact on total 
welfare resulting from a one-dollar reduction in the price of an imported good is greater for a 
country with a population of 300 million than for a country with 30.6 million people. However, if 
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we evaluate the welfare impact as a percentage of the GDP which is undoubtedly more 
appropriate, the situation is reversed: the welfare impact in Morocco is three time as big as US 
one in scenario 1 (gain for both countries) and it is nine time as big in scenario 3 (loss for 
Morocco, gain for the US).  
 
Lastly and more importantly, these results prove the importance of an asymmetrical and gradual 
liberalization process for Morocco. As the liberalization scenario become more liberal, the 
changes in GDP and welfare are lowered for Morocco. Finally, the Moroccan gains associated 
with Scenarios 1 and 2 result in recession and impoverishment in Scenario 3 (see table 2 and 
figures 4 and 5). This last result complete and qualify the conclusion we got from a partial 
equilibrium approach. Considering only the impact on consumers in a full liberalization scenario, 
the WITS-SMART model revealed a gain resulting mostly from a reduction of the prices of 
cereals. In a more general context integrating producer and linkage effects, it turns out that this 
benefit turns into a net welfare loss (equal to US$112 US million) resulting from important 
producer losses which outweigh consumer gain. This result clearly indicates that Moroccan 
producer surplus will suffer from a full liberalization scenario. These results could have 
significant implications on the structure of production in Morocco. Therefore, the results dictate 
clearly in favour of a progressive dismantelment in order to limit the adjustment costs. 
Table 7. Impacts of the three different scenarios on welfare (in millions of US dollars) and GDP growth rate 
(in %) 
Scenarios Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Regions Welfare GDP Welfare GDP Welfare GDP 
Morocco 37.08 0.37 26.49 0.18 -112.1 -0.78 
USA 962.02 0.03 1001.65 0.03 1115.94 0.04 
RofNAFR -38.19 0.09 -39.55 0.09 -43.37 0.08 
ROW -1277.54 0.06 -1303.83 0.05 -1375.13 0.05 
Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
Figure 4. Impacts on welfare  (in millions of US dollars) 
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Figure 5. Impacts on the rate of growth of the GDP (in %) 
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Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
We have also calculated the decomposition of the welfare from the various levels of trade 
liberalisation schemes. We have indicated the main two effects, allocative effects and terms of 
trade effect usually presented for this kind of analyse. We can see that the most important effect 
for Morocco is linked with the terms of trade effect. Indeed, with a strongly asymmetrical 
liberalisation scheme, the terms of trade effect is roughly ten times more important than the 
intermediary asymmetrical liberalisation scenario. And obviously, this effect becomes negative 
with a full reciprocity agreement. 
 
Table 8. Welfare decomposition according to the level of ambition (in millions of US dollars) 
Scenarios Strongly 
asymmetrical 
liberalization 
Intermediate 
asymmetrical 
liberalization 
Full reciprocity 
Regions Allocative 
effect 
Terms 
of 
Trade 
effect 
Allocative 
effect 
Terms 
of Trade 
effect 
Allocative 
effect 
Terms 
of Trade 
effect 
Rest North 
Africa 
-1.7 -36.8 -2.2 -37.7 -3.5 -40 
Morocco 20.2 16 25.1 1.7 -53.6 -54.8 
EU 25 465.6 -120.4 466.2 -129.7 468.5 -148.3 
USA 488.4 664.2 482.7 702 464.5 812.1 
Turkey -3.1 -4.3 -3.2 -5 -3.2 -7.1 
Rest of the 
World 
-814.8 -5.85 -933.8 -531.1 -960.2 -561.9 
Source: Calculated from the GTAP Model, version 6.2 
 
5.2.2. Impacts on sectoral value added  
 
If we consider the impact on the output, and more precisely on the variation of the value added in 
the two countries, we can conclude that the FTA creates both winners and losers in the two 
countries. In Morocco, meat, electronic equipment, leather, textiles and clothing benefit as the 
trade scenario becomes more liberal. Textile and clothing apparel appear to be (and will probably 
be) among the biggest winners. This activity can be expected to take advantage of increasing 
production in a short period of time as a result of immediate liberalization. On the other hand, 
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transport equipment, metals, mineral products and wheat lose out in the same process. Our 
simulation is therefore consistent with the fact that wheat is a highly political issue in Morocco. 
Eight million people in Morocco depend on wheat production, which is the main crop produced 
by small farmers. A full immediate liberalization in this sector would cause a large percentage of 
the Moroccan rural population to lose their livelihood. Not surprisingly, wheat is the only US 
product to remain subject to a quota in the actual agreement.  
 
US farmers are expected to be the biggest beneficiaries of the agreement with Morocco, namely 
for wheat production, beef and animal feed, particularly for poultry which corresponds to the 
most important feed grain demand and the fastest growing meat production in Morocco. 
However, American oil seeds producers would experience severe losses in every scenario 
(Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Impacts of the three scenarios of trade liberalization on selected industrial and agricultural activities 
(% of variation of value added) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Sectors Morocco USA Morocco USA Morocco USA 
Meat products nec -1.74 0.12 0.28 0.11 6.33 0.11 
Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse -1.57 0.1 -0.28 0.09 4.13 0.07 
Electronic equipment -1.34 0.08 -0.76 0.07 1.57 0.04 
Transport equipment nec -1.21 0.06 -3.84 0.06 -8.07 0.06 
Metals nec -1.07 0.07 -0.65 0.04 -2.02 0.07 
Machinery and equipment nec -0,86 0,05 -0,74 0,05 1,08 0,04 
Animal products -0.81 1.00 -0.44 0.97 -0.2 0.16 
Ferrous metals -0.8 0.04 -0.65 0.06 0.14 0.04 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts -0.17 -0.75 1.57 -1.26 0.26 -0.85 
Mineral products nec -0.14 0.03 -0.66 0.04 -2.02 0.07 
Leather products -0.14 0.18 -0.08 0.17 0.45 0.18 
Wheat 0.33 2.28 -0.87 2.68 -4.42 3.88 
Textiles 0.88 0.11 1.84 0.13 5.26 0.2 
Vegetable oils and fats 1.11 -1.25 1.57 -1.26 2.73 -1.27 
Wearing apparel 2.82 0.03 3.64 0.04 6.42 0.09 
Oil seeds 3.06 -10.65 2.52 -10.67 1.87 -10.76 
Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
5.2.3. Impacts on sectoral exports, imports and trade balance  
 
The general picture is roughly the same when we consider the potential effects on trade. In 
Morocco, under full liberalization, the trade balance would improve particularly for clothing, 
sugar, vegetables and leather products, while it would deteriorate notably for wheat. In the US, 
the FTA would cause the greatest improvement for chemical, rubber and plastic products and 
textiles, while trade deterioration would be felt most in oil seed and vegetables (Table 10). Part of 
these changes is related to the evolution of the terms of trade, which would deteriorate 
significantly for Morocco should the liberalization process be complete, immediate and perfectly 
reciprocal as described by the third scenario (Figure 6)  
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Table 10. Changes in trade balance for selected products (in millions of US dollars) 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Sectors Morocco USA Morocco USA Morocco USA 
Wearing apparel 89.13 -8.81 108.86 -3.23 166.24 39.38
Sugar 2.78 5.51 3.31 5.39 5.18 5.04
Vegetables, fruit, nuts -1.85 -146.63 0.7 -147.43 4.9 -167.79
Leather products -0.6 6.07 -0.13 5.29 3.5 4.58
Vegetable oils and fats 0.08 -146.65 -0.6 -152.03 3.12 -149.66
Crops nec -0.04 -124.14 0.32 -134.27 2.49 -164.27
Plant-based fibers 1.04 25.4 1.3 23.81 2.32 19.16
Raw milk 1.33 -0.25 1.37 -0.28 1.51 -0.37
Fishing -0.17 0.79 -0.12 0.78 0.27 0.76
Oil seeds 1.01 -789.22 0.25 -790.89 -0.58 -798.01
Meat products nec -0.1 68.87 -0.08 67.05 -1.8 66.48
Cereal grains nec -1.13 33.17 -4.74 38.55 -9.84 44.69
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods -12.43 194.04 -13.33 195.33 -12.76 193.7
Machinery and equipment nec -12.42 239.91 -15.3 226.23 -15.61 164
Dairy products -1.36 -28.72 -1.54 -26.51 -17.36 4.72
Paper products, publishing -1.91 30.86 -6.08 38.29 -18.57 56.17
Mineral products nec -3.58 20.45 -12.69 32.59 -41.19 65.01
Textiles -24.3 81.72 -29.96 99.31 -58.94 161.81
Wheat -0.04 186.17 -19.43 215.63 -90.77 305
Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
Figure 6. Terms of Trade (%) 
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Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
5.2.4. Impacts of a possible EU response 
 
We have also simulated a ‘positive retaliation’ from the EU in response to this agreement. We 
have previously argued that a ‘negative response’ (retaliation) is poorly plausible. At the 
opposite, the possibility of a ‘positive response’ is perfectly plausible. In this prospect, we have 
considered the strongly asymmetrical liberalisation where the US are granting important 
concessions to Morocco and in parallel, EU is granting a full duty free quota free market access 
to Morocco and the Rest of North African Countries (Scenario 4). Il could be done through an 
extensive euromed partnership agreement.  
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This response will of course considerably increase the GDP and the welfare of Morocco and 
others North African countries benefiting from the Euromed partnership agreement. EU will 
slightly increase his GDP and the welfare will decrease but not very significantly (Table 11). The 
cost of this response is therefore not very high for the EU and the likely impact are strategically 
and economically important, both for Morocco and EU. 
 
Table 11: Impact of EU response to the US-Morocco FTA  
(GDP variation in %)              (Equivalent variation, in US Millions $) 
Region Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
RofNAFR -38.19 1512.47
Morocco 37.08 821.43
EU25 368.11 327.29
USA 962.02 714.22
Turkey -6.91 -4.89
ROW -1277.54 -1265.09
 
Source: Author’s Calculations from GTAP 6.2 
Region Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
RofNAFR 0 0.25 
Morocco 0.06 0.53 
EU25 0.01 0.02 
USA 0 0 
Turkey 0 -0.01 
ROW -0.01 -0.01 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our analysis justifies the idea that a FTA between two zones at different levels of development 
needs to follow a progressive process of tariff dismantling for the most strategic sectors so as to 
limit the adjustment costs. It also argues in favour of an agreement which is not based on the 
principle of full reciprocity. Under an immediate, full and reciprocal trade liberalization, 
Morocco would experience a decrease in its economic growth, a loss of economic welfare, a 
deterioration of its terms of trade and an important deterioration of its trade balance (Scenario 3) 
However, strongly asymmetrical and progressive liberalization (Scenario 1) would stimulate 
Moroccan economic growth, improve its welfare and its terms of trade and leave the trade 
balance almost unchanged.  Simultaneously, for the US, there is a relative indifference between 
the 3 scenarios as far as the impacts on welfare, the rate of growth and the evolution of the value 
added are concerned. Tables 2 and 3 show that the effects on the US are quite similar on these 
levels. When we consider the impact on the sectoral trade balance of the 3 scenarios (Table 4), 
the picture is more contrasted. For the US, a gradual and asymmetrical agreement would cause 
both improvements of the balance of trade in areas such as machinery and equipment, chemical, 
rubber, plastic products, wheat, and a deterioration in oil seeds, vegetables, fruits and nuts, oils 
and fats. However, according to our simulations, the global impact on the US trade balance 
would be more advantageous with a gradual agreement (the total impact of Scenario 1 is a 
deterioration equal to US$77.65 million) than with the full liberalization scenario (which would 
cause a US$123.67 million deterioration). As a result, the move from a more liberal to a less 
liberal scenario seems to be mutually advantageous for the two countries, as far as the trade 
balances are concerned. However, these figures must be considered cautiously. A more precise 
evaluation would require a dynamic simulation and a comparison of full liberalization with a 
scenario closer to the actual agreement, which is the objective of our oncoming research project. 
Beyond this strictly economic assessment, it is clear that the objectives of the FTA for the two 
trading partners are very different in a more general perspective: 
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- By engaging in free trade with the US, Moroccan authorities expects to change the country’s 
reliance on agriculture, which employs more than 40% of the labour force. Despite important 
investments in irrigation projects, this situation makes the country very vulnerable to weather 
hazards. In short, the main objective of the Moroccan government is to reduce the country’s 
dependence on agriculture, phosphate, and remittances, by developing industrial production and 
tourism. As our simulation tends to demonstrate, this gamble on the future of the Moroccan 
authorities remains problematic. Not that agriculture may decline. Unfortunately, such a 
perspective is quite plausible, not as a result of a faster growth in the industrial activities 
springing from modernization, but because cheap imports of agricultural product may undermine 
agriculture.  
 
- For the US, the main objective is not primarily economic, but rather geostrategic. Following the 
FTA with Jordan in 2000, the agreement with Morocco is a new step toward the creation of a 
large United States-Middle East free trade area, which is an important goal of the American 
administration, so as to integrate the Middle East into the modern global economy and create a 
friend and ally zone in an uncertain region. The next step will be Bahrain. National security 
considerations are probably the most important in this project, alongside the development of 
business transactions for US farmers and investors. The choice of Morocco is not random, but is 
the result of US political recognition of Morocco’s commitment to reform, modernization and 
openness.  
 
The differences identified in the objectives and the potential results of FTA are not necessarily an 
obstacle with the installation of a “win-win game”, because development and security issues 
work jointly in the fight against poverty. For a young economy such as Morocco, the expected 
profits are due to the cumulative reinforcement of growth and income, based on an 
industrialization process arising from a modernization of the industrial system. In fact, 
modernization and industrialization require major economic and social changes which cannot be 
shortened to a mere liberalization process, even though this liberalization may contribute to 
achieve these goals. Important infrastructure investments as well as significant social changes 
will be necessary 7. It would be a huge error to believe that economic and social development can 
result automatically from the simple trade liberalization, especially when the trading partner is a 
major ‘trade actor’ such as the US. Finally, the success of the experiences of development does 
not only rely on a global integration strategy. They are also securely based on the forces and the 
internal resources. No sustainable development is possible if it is not based on endogenous 
dynamics.  
                                                 
7 See for example the massive expansion in the northern city of Tangier which will multiply port traffic by 15 times, 
reduce transport costs to the US by 50% and bring Morocco to an average 6 days sea distance from the US. 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEXE 1: Sectoral aggregation 
 
  New sector 
No. Code Description 
1 pdr Paddy rice 30lum Wood products 
2 wht Wheat 31ppp Paper products, publishing 
3 gro Cereal grains nec 32p_c Petroleum, coal products 
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 33crp Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 
5 osd Oil seeds 34nmm Mineral products nec 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 35i_s Ferrous metals 
7 pfb Plant-based fibers 36nfm Metals nec 
8 ocr Crops nec 37fmp Metal products 
9 ctl Cattle,sheep,goats,horses 38mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
10 oap Animal products nec 39otn Transport equipment nec 
11 rmk Raw milk 40ele Electronic equipment 
12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 41ome Machinery and equipment nec 
13 frs Forestry 42omf Manufactures nec 
14 fsh Fishing 43ely Electricity 
15 coa Coal 44gdt Gas manufacture, distribution 
16 oil Oil 45wtr Water 
17 gas Gas 46cns Construction 
18 omn Minerals nec 47trd Trade 
19 cmt Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse 48otp Transport nec 
20 omt Meat products nec 49wtp Sea transport 
21 vol Vegetable oils and fats 50atp Air transport 
22 mil Dairy products 51cmn Communication 
23 pcr Processed rice 52ofi Financial services nec 
24 sgr Sugar 53isr Insurance 
25 ofd Food products nec 54obs Business services nec 
26 b_t Beverages and tobacco products 55ros Recreation and other services 
27 tex Textiles 56osg PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 
28 wap Wearing apparel 57dwe Dwellings 
29 lea Leather products 
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ANNEXE 2: Geographical aggregation 
 
No. Code Aggregated région Comprising 
1 RofNAFR  Rest of North Africa Tunisia; Rest of North Africa. 
2 Morocco   Morocco. 
3 EU25   
Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; 
United Kingdom; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania. 
4 USA   United States. 
5 Turkey   Turkey. 
6 ROW   Australia; New Zealand; Rest of Oceania; China; Hong Kong; 
Japan; Korea; Taiwan; Rest of East Asia; Indonesia; Malaysia; 
Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Vietnam; Rest of Southeast 
Asia; Bangladesh; India; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia; 
Canada; Mexico; Rest of North America; Colombia; Peru; 
Venezuela; Rest of Andean Pact; Argentina; Brazil; Chile; 
Uruguay; Rest of South America; Central America; Rest of 
FTAA; Rest of the Caribbean; Switzerland; Rest of EFTA; 
Rest of Europe; Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; Romania; Russian 
Federation; Rest of Former Soviet Union; Rest of Middle East; 
Botswana; South Africa; Rest of South African CU; Malawi; 
Mozambique; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe; Rest of SADC; 
Madagascar; Uganda; Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
